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Immigration Law
Bianca N. DiBella*
Hannah Couch**
This Article surveys cases from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit from January 1, 2021, through December 31,
2021, in which immigration law was a central focus of the case.1 The
Article begins with a discussion of asylum relief, followed by summaries
of cases disposed on procedural or jurisdictional grounds. It then
discusses the standard of review the Eleventh Circuit applies to cases
decided by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and the
Immigration Court. It then describes the Eleventh Circuit’s recent
jurisprudence around issues of habeas corpus law.
I. ASYLUM
A. Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution
The Eleventh Circuit issued several opinions this past year regarding
whether a petitioner established past persecution or an individualized
well-founded fear of future persecution supporting asylum or
withholding of removal.2
*Associate, Troutman Pepper Hamilton Sanders LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Florida (B.A., 2014); Vanderbilt University Law School (J.D., 2017). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
**Assistant United States Attorney for the Middle District of Georgia. University of
Georgia (B.B.A., A.B.J., 2013); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., 2018). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of immigration law during the prior Survey period, see Bianca N.
DiBella & Andrew J. Mueller, Immigration Law, 72 MERCER L. REV. 1203 (2021).
2. The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished opinions held, at least in part, that
substantial evidence supported the immigration judges’ (IJ) decisions to deny asylum,
withholding of removal, or Convention Against Torture relief. See Garcia-Garcia v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 861 F. App’x 413 (11th Cir. 2021) (denying asylum and withholding of removal
to a Guatemalan citizen and her minor child because not being offered a job in a
restaurant and fearing that she would not be able to find another job upon return was
insufficient to establish past persecution or fear of future persecution); Zacarias-Lopez v.
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In Jathursan v. U.S. Attorney General,3 Jathursan applied for
asylum, withholding of his removal, and Convention Against Torture
(CAT) protection, arguing that he previously suffered persecution and
had a well-founded fear of future persecution on the statutorily
protected grounds of race or ethnicity, political opinion as a supporter of
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),4 imputed LTTE
membership through his brother, and status as a Tamil-failed asylum
seeker.5 At his removal hearing, he testified that he endured several
beatings, including his limbs being tied together and having an iron rod
forced through his rectum by the Eelam People’s Democratic Party
(EPDP), which operates with the tacit consent of the Sri Lankan
government. Jathursan claimed he reported this to the police, who did
nothing. Jathursan feared persecution from the Sri Lankan army, as
Sri Lankan army soldiers once approached him at his car repair shop,
demanded his services or merchandise, and refused to pay. He claimed
the EPDP and Sri Lankan army work together to persecute Tamils and
feared they will persecute him again based on his status as a Tamilfailed asylum seeker, who are presumed to support the LTTE. He
presented news articles outlining the torture Tamil-failed asylum
seekers face upon their return to Sri Lanka.6
U.S. Att’y Gen., 860 F. App’x 620 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding that substantial evidence
supported IJ’s finding that Guatemalan citizen had not experienced past persecution and
had no well-founded fear of future persecution); Davila v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 860 F. App’x
151 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding that substantial evidence supported denial of Nicaraguan
citizen’s application for withholding of removal); Diego-Francisco v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 857 F.
App’x 483 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding that substantial evidence supported IJ’s finding that
government rebutted presumption that Guatemalan citizen had well-founded fear of
persecution upon return); Jian Lin Pan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 848 F. App’x 382 (11th Cir.
2021) (per curiam) (holding that substantial evidence supported BIA’s opinion affirming
IJ’s finding that noncitizen’s testimony was not credible); Zapata-Rivero v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 847 F. App’x 671 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (holding that substantial evidence
supported IJ’s adverse credibility finding); Pablo-Atz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 846 F. App’x 822
(11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (holding that substantial evidence supported determination
in denying asylum based on failure to show that persecution was based on protected
ground); Gautam v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 844 F. App’x 119 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding that
applicant failed to establish asylum or withholding-of-removal eligibility and that
substantial evidence supported finding that petitioner was ineligible for CAT deferral).
3. 17 F.4th 1365 (11th Cir. 2021).
4. Id. at 1370. The LTTE was a Tamil separatist group in Sri Lanka that fought
against the Sinhalese-dominated government during a decades-long civil war. Even after
the LTTE lost the war in 2009, those suspected of having LTTE ties have been beaten,
tortured, and raped. Such violence is largely carried out by the Elam People’s Democratic
Party, which operates with the tacit consent of the Sir Lankan government. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1370–71.
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Although the Immigration Judge (IJ) found Jathursan credible, he
denied relief based on past persecution and a well-founded fear of
future persecution because Jathursan had not shown a sufficient nexus
between the past persecution and a protected ground.7 The IJ found
that the Sri Lankan army and EPDP were motivated by pecuniary gain
and that Jathursan’s proposed group of “returned asylum seekers” was
not a cognizable social group because it “lacked particularity and social
distinction.”8 The IJ also denied Jathursan’s withholding-of-removal
claim because it “naturally followed” from the denial of asylum that
Jathursan “could not meet the higher burden of proof for withholding of
removal.”9 Finally, the judge denied Jathursan’s CAT claim due to
insufficient evidence to show that he would “more likely than not” be
tortured in the future, despite Jathursan’s presentation of “ample
evidence that the Sri Lankan government has committed human rights
violations against Tamils in the past.” 10
Jathursan appealed, and the BIA affirmed.11 The BIA stated it
“agreed with the [IJ] that the record evidence does not establish an
objectively reasonable fear of persecution . . . based on Tamil ethnicity,
having sought asylum, or both,” despite the IJ making no such
finding.12 Because the BIA found Jathursan could not meet the
standard for his asylum claim based on past persecution or a wellfounded fear of future persecution, it assumed Jathursan could not
meet the heightened standard for his withholding-of-removal claim.13
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the BIA that Jathursan failed to
show past persecution in connection with a protected ground, but held
that the BIA failed to give reasoned consideration to Jathursan’s
evidence showing a well-founded fear of future persecution due to its
misstatements of the record, remanding to the BIA to determine
whether Jathursan met the asylum standard.14 The court also
remanded to the BIA the issue of whether Jathursan met the
heightened standard for his withholding-of-removal claim based on his
well-founded fear of future persecution.15

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 1371.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1372.
Id. at 1373.
Id. at 1375.
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The court also held that the BIA “flatly ignore[d] the grounds
presented” by Jathursan for CAT relief.16 The court held that the BIA
(1) relied only on Jathursan’s documentary evidence involving Tamil
detainees and ignored Jathursan’s testimony regarding his detainment
and torture by the EPDP; (2) failed to address that the EPDP works
with the Sri Lankan government; and (3) stated that “the [I]mmigration
[J]udge did not make adequate findings on whether that mistreatment
was inflicted with the consent or acquiescence of a public official[,]”
thereby admitting it was unable to consider whether Jathursan would
face future torture.17 Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded
Jathursan’s CAT claim.18
In Murugan v. U.S. Attorney General,19 Murugan applied for asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT relief.20 Murugan claimed that he
suffered past persecution in Sri Lanka when he was arrested by the Sri
Lankan army three times: once while returning home from work, after
which he was jailed overnight; once while distributing humanitarian
aid to refugees who had come from a village controlled by the LTTE,
after which he was tied up, tortured, and interrogated for four days;
and once for continuing to help refugees, after which he was threatened
with going to the “fourth floor,” otherwise known as the army torture
camp for LTTE affiliates, but instead was released after six hours.21
Murugan claims he was arrested on account of an imputed political
opinion and membership in the particular social group of Tamils and
that he would suffer future persecution and torture if he returned to Sri
Lanka.22
After his removal hearing, where he conceded removability, the IJ
denied Murugan’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
CAT relief.23 “The IJ found that the harms Murugan suffered did not
rise to the level of past persecution,” and that Murugan failed to
demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution because (1) he
failed to offer evidence, other than his testimony, that anyone had
indicated that they would harm him upon his return; (2) his family
remains unharmed; and (3) Murugan could “safely relocate within Sri

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id. at 1376.
Id. at 1377.
10 F.4th 1185 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1189.
Id. at 1189–90.
Id. at 1191.
Id.
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Lanka and that it is reasonable to expect him to do so.”24 Finally, the IJ
found that Murugan “failed to demonstrate a nexus between the alleged
persecution and an imputed political opinion . . . [or] his Tamil
ethnicity,” or “that the proposed group of returned asylum seekers was
‘overbroad and not socially distinct.’”25 The BIA adopted the IJ’s
decision on appeal, concluding that, because Murugan “failed to
establish his eligibility for asylum, . . . he failed to establish eligibility
for withholding of removal or CAT relief.”26
On appeal, Murugan argued that the BIA and the IJ “committed
various legal and factual errors in analyzing his claims.”27 The court
held that the harms Murugan suffered—both physical and mental—”do
not rise to the extreme level of persecution.”28 Because he did not show
past persecution, Murugan was required to show that he had a
“subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable” fear of future
persecution if he returned to Sri Lanka, even if he relocated within Sri
Lanka, which he failed to do.29 Specifically, the court noted that while
“some” materials Murugan submitted to the IJ and BIA were
considered outdated and others were not, the IJ and BIA considered all
materials and found no pattern or practice of persecution of Tamils in
Sri Lanka.30 “Under the highly deferential substantial evidence
standard, [the court] review[ed] the evidence in the light most favorable
to the agency’s decision and dr[ew] all reasonable inferences in favor of
that decision.”31 Because the record did not compel a reversal, the court
upheld the BIA’s and IJ’s findings.32
Furthermore, the court held that Murugan failed to show a nexus
between the persecution and his imputed political opinion as favoring
the LTTE by aiding refugees.33 “But when Murugan’s counsel asked
Murugan . . . whether the army questioned Murugan about whether he
was involved in the LTTE, Murugan responded: ‘No, no, no, they were
just suspecting and that they were saying that I had contact with these
people during war time.’”34 The court found that this “undercut his prior

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 1191–92.
Id. at 1192.
Id.
Id. at 1189.
Id. at 1192.
Id. at 1193.
Id. at 1194.
Id. (citing Silva v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229, 1236 (11th Cir. 2006)).
Id. (citing Silva, 448 F.3d at 1236).
Id. at 1195.
Id. at 1196.
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assertions” and held that the BIA did not lack a “substantial basis for
its conclusion that Murugan’s fear of persecution on account of the
allegedly imputed political opinion was not well-founded.”35 Because
Murugan did not succeed on his asylum claim, he “necessarily failed to
establish eligibility for withholding of removal or protection under
CAT.”36
Judge Beverly Martin37 dissented38 on the majority’s analysis and
conclusion that Murugan failed to establish a “subjectively genuine and
objectively reasonable” fear of future persecution if he returned to Sri
Lanka.39 She stated that the BIA and the majority failed to consider
evidence “that in October 2018, the Sri Lankan government changed
drastically when the former president, who had been accused of
authorizing war crimes and other human rights abuses against Tamils
‘blindsided’ political observers and ‘suddenly’ returned as prime
minister[,]” whereas she saw it “as substantial and highly probative
evidence of a pattern or practice of government persecution of Tamils.”40
Additionally, Judge Martin believed Murugan sufficiently established a
pattern or practice of persecution, and stated the IJ’s and BIA’s findings
that Murugan failed to produce evidence showing that conditions
persisted beyond 2016 were not supported by the record.41

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Judge Martin retired from the Eleventh Circuit on September 30, 2021. See Judge
Beverly Martin to Join Center on Civil Justice as Executive Director, NYU LAW NEWS (Oct.
4, 2021), https://www.law.nyu.edu/news/judge-beverly-martin-joins-center-civil-justice.
38. Judge Martin’s critiques of immigration policy and argument for shifts in rhetoric
around non-citizens in an effort to humanize them and their circumstances was made
evident in this case. See Jennifer Doherty, Circuit Judges Spar Over the Term ‘Alien’ in
Opinions, LAW 360 (July 8, 2021), https://www.law360.com/articles/1401539/circuitjudgesspar-over-the-term-alien-in-opinions.
39. Marugan, 10 F.4th at 1197.
40. Id. at 1196–97 (alterations in original).
41. Id. at 1200. Such evidence included a 2015 Human Rights Report wherein the
United States Department of State “observed that people reported ‘harassment of . . .
persons viewed as sympathizers of the banned terrorist group the LTTE as well as
arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, rape, and other forms of sexual and gender-based
violence committed by police and security forces[,]” a 2017 Human Rights Report finding
that “government discrimination toward and security forces harassment of Tamils . . .
persisted,’” as well as a 2016 Huffington Post article describing a “‘troubling’ string of
arrests of Tamils by the Sri Lankan government, made ‘under the guise of national
security.’” Id. at 1198, 1200 (alterations in original).
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B. Particular Social Group
The Eleventh Circuit issued five unpublished opinions in 2021
regarding whether a petitioner sufficiently defined a particular
protected social group of which he or she claimed to be a member.
In Funez-Turcios v. U.S. Attorney General,42 the Eleventh Circuit
held Funez-Turcios’s proposed social group of “former public-school
students who refused gang recruitment” that returned “to Honduras as
a member of an American family,” spouse of an American citizen, and
stepfather to three American children, was not cognizable under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).43 Because this proposed group
was impermissibly circular and not socially distinct, it failed the
particular social group and particularity requirements under the INA,
as the BIA concluded.44 The Eleventh Circuit denied his petition.45
Similarly, in Lazaro-Ruano v. U.S. Attorney General,46 LazaroRuano, a Guatemalan citizen, was denied asylum and withholding of
removal because her proposed particular social group of “young
Guatemalan women forced into prostitution” was circularly defined
since the members of the group did not “share an immutable ‘narrowing
characteristic’ other than the alleged persecution.”47
In Menocal-Vargas v. U.S. Attorney General,48 Menocal-Vargas, a
citizen of Honduras, failed to state a sufficiently specific particular
social group and to establish that he was persecuted or would face
future persecution.49 In his applications for asylum, withholding of
removal, and CAT relief, he stated that he “faced persecution by the
gang Maras Salvatrucha (“MS”) because he told young men and
[women] not to join gangs, because MS believed he worked for the army
to fight gangs, and because MS threatened to kill his family unless his
son joined MS.”50 Menocal-Vargas expounded on this at his hearing in
front of the IJ, after which the IJ found there had been no past
persecution and that Menocal-Vargas “failed to show he has been or will
be persecuted based on membership in a protected particular social

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
2019)).
48.
49.
50.

853 F. App’x 395 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
Id. at 396.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 399.
861 F. App’x 396 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 401 (citing Amezcua-Preciado v. United States AG, 943 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir.
853 F. App’x 323 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
Id. at 325.
Id. at 324–25.
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group or political opinion.”51 He was denied asylum, withholding of
removal, and CAT relief, and the BIA dismissed his appeal.52
The Eleventh Circuit held that a group of people “actively speaking
against gang affiliation” is not sufficiently specific to constitute a
particular social group or political opinion and that past persecution
was not because of that political opinion; thus, the Eleventh Circuit
dismissed the appeal.53
The Eleventh Circuit reached similar holdings in Alvarado v. U.S.
Attorney General54 and Marroquin-Gutierrez v. U.S. Attorney General.55
In Alvarado, the Eleventh Circuit held that Lopez Alvarado’s proposed
social group consisting of young male Guatemalans who were opposed
to gang violence lacked the requisite particularity and social
distinction.56 In Gutierrez, the Eleventh Circuit held that another
Guatemalan citizen failed to establish that his status as a self-employed
vehicle owner who was viewed by his community as a driver who
refused to cooperate with gangs constituted membership in a particular
social group.57
C. Nexus
The Eleventh Circuit issued multiple opinions this past year
regarding whether a petitioner established a nexus between his or her
membership in a particular social group and the harm he or she
claimed he or she would experience upon return, largely affirming the
BIA’s and IJ’s decision.
In Angel-Lopez v. U.S. Attorney General,58 Angel-Lopez, who failed to
appear at his first removal hearing, was found mentally incompetent to
represent himself and was assigned counsel.59 Counsel, on his behalf,
then applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. In
support, counsel submitted Angel-Lopez’s psychiatric medical records
revealing that he suffers from schizophrenia, as well as two
declarations by Dr. Samuel Nickels, who described the underfunded
state of mental healthcare in El Salvador and that electroshock
therapy—often delivered without anesthesia or patient consent—was a
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 325.
Id.
Id. at 326.
851 F. App’x 919 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
847 F. App’x 686 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
Alvarado, 851 F. App’x at 922–23.
Marroquin-Gutierrez, 847 F. App’x at 687-88.
853 F. App’x 440 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
Id. at 441–42.
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common treatment at the only public psychiatric hospital. Dr. Nickels
also stated that those with psychosocial disabilities “faced strong
stigmatization,” that the police “dealt harshly” with everyone and those
with such disabilities were at an “extreme risk of harm or abuse,” and
that gangs also abused those with such disabilities.60 The IJ found that
Angel-Lopez failed to show his fear of future persecution on account of
his proposed social groups and failed to provide specific facts
establishing his membership in a particular social group and the harm
he would experience and the BIA affirmed.61
The Eleventh Circuit held that the BIA and IJ had considered all the
evidence and “gave adequate and reasonable explanations for [their]
decisions.”62 And because “any stigmatization and incidents of abuse, if
they were to occur,” could be the result of “underfunded treatment and
insufficient training programs,” rather than “a desire to harm the
mentally ill,” the Eleventh Circuit was unpersuaded by Angel-Lopez’s
challenge to the BIA’s determination that he did not establish a nexus
between his membership in a particular social group and the harm he
claimed he would experience upon return.63 Accordingly, the Eleventh
Circuit denied his petition.64
In Martinez v. U.S. Attorney General,65 the BIA and IJ, focusing only
on Martinez’s lack of showing of past persecution, failed to give
reasoned consideration of his well-founded fear of future persecution
claim, resulting in the Eleventh Circuit remanding the case to the
BIA.66 Martinez alleged Cuban officials arrested him and threatened
him with mistreatment because he wrote for a magazine critical of
Cuban tax policies, even after relocating to a different city.67 The IJ
found Martinez credible but concluded the officials’ actions did not rise
to the level of past persecution.68 The IJ also “rejected as objectively
unreasonable Martinez’s fear of future persecution because the evidence
did not suggest he ‘would be singled out for persecution’” because
officials were not searching for him, a warrant was not out for his
arrest, the officials released him without injury and charges when he

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 442.
Id.
Id. at 444.
Id. at 444–45.
Id. at 445.
992 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1294–95.
Id. at 1287.
Id. at 1289.
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was arrested, and his family remained unharmed.69 The BIA affirmed
and further found that the evidence of “general political conditions” in
Cuban reports was an insufficient showing that Martinez would be
persecuted upon return.70
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the BIA’s and IJ’s finding that the
officials’ actions did not rise to the level of past persecution.71 But
because the IJ’s decision, which the BIA adopted, misstated the record
evidence crucial to his well-founded fear of future persecution
argument, it resulted in the BIA’s and IJ’s failure to provide reasoned
consideration.72 Specifically, the IJ acknowledged that Martinez
submitted reports detailing a pattern or practice “of severe political
oppression . . . by the Cuban government . . . aimed at opposition
party . . . journalists.”73 The IJ then stated that Martinez “provided no
evidence that the Cuban government recognizes him as an opposition
party journalist,” overlooking Martinez’s testimony regarding officials
considering him a writer of a magazine critical of Cuban tax policies.74
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit remanded to the BIA.75
In Sanchez-Castro v. U.S. Attorney General,76 Sanchez-Castro, a
citizen of El Salvador, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and
CAT relief.77 During her removal hearing, she testified that a gang
targeted her family by extortion and threatened to rape and kill them
because it assumed her father’s work in the United States made them
wealthy. The IJ, despite finding her credible, found that
Sanchez-Castro’s experience did not rise to the level of past persecution
and that she did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution
because her fears were based on general gang violence, not a statutorily
protected ground for relief.78
Accordingly, she did not qualify for asylum, withholding of removal,
or CAT relief.79 The BIA dismissed her appeal, affirming the IJ’s
decision but also distinguishing between when “a persecutor targets a
family member as a means to an end,” versus when the gang is

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id. at 1290.
Id. at 1293. Judge Martin dissented as to this point only. Id. at 1295.
Id. at 1294.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1295.
998 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1283.
Id. at 1284–85.
Id. at 1285.
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motivated by “animus against the family per se,” with only the latter
being enough to obtain relief.80
The Attorney General then issued his decision in Matter of L-E-A-,81
concluding a nuclear family will not qualify as a particular social group
but left undisturbed the BIA’s “analysis of the circumstances in which
membership in a family constitutes a central reason for persecution.”82
The BIA then, again, dismissed Sanchez-Castro’s appeal on remand.83
Based on the Attorney General’s decision, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that “[t]he record does not compel a finding that any
persecution that Sanchez-Castro suffered or fears occurred ‘because of’
the status of her nuclear family.”84 Rather, the record showed that the
gang engaged in the type of extortion and threatening behavior
Sanchez-Castro claimed indiscriminately.85 The court held that
substantial evidence supported the IJ’s finding that Sanchez-Castro
failed to satisfy the nexus requirement for asylum and withholding of
removal and that she was not eligible for asylum or withholding of
removal.86 It also held that she failed to establish any likelihood that
she will suffer harm inflicted by or with the consent of a government
official, thus denying CAT relief.87
II. PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION
The Eleventh Circuit resolved multiple procedural and jurisdictional
issues this past year, including an issue of first impression.
In Rios-Hernandez v. U.S. Attorney General,88 the Eleventh Circuit
had a similar holding to that of Sanchez-Castro. It held that RiosHernandez, a citizen of El Salvador, failed to adequately challenge all
elements upon which the IJ based her conclusions regarding RiosHernandez’s proposed family groups, and substantial evidence
supported a finding that the government of El Salvador would not
acquiesce the torture he endured.89 During his merits hearing, RiosHernandez argued that he suffered a (1) fear of gang persecution due to
his family membership and “neglected and abandoned young males
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
27 I. & N. Dec. 581 (A.G. 2019).
Sanchez-Castro, 998 F.3d at 1285.
Id.
Id. at 1286.
Id. at 1287.
Id. at 1288.
Id.
859 F. App’x 865 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 869.
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from Anamorós,” and (2) fear of being tortured by gangs if returned.90
The IJ found him credible but concluded that the proposed groups did
not qualify as particular social groups under the INA and that, even if
they qualified, his persecution was based on his membership in those
social groups. The IJ also denied him CAT relief because he failed to
establish that the government of El Salvador instigates or acquiesces to
gang torture and the previous harm did not amount to torture. The BIA
affirmed.91
Rios-Hernandez appealed, arguing as to asylum that the IJ erred in
her conclusion that his family did not qualify as a particular social
group, that he was not a member of the neglected and abandoned young
males from Anamorós, and that he had not established his persecution
was based on his proposed social groups.92 The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed and further held that because Rios-Hernandez challenged only
the IJ’s conclusion about his group membership and not that the group
lacked all three elements necessary to qualify as a particular social
group, his argument failed in regard to his second proposed social
group.93 The Eleventh Circuit also held that Rios-Hernandez’s challenge
as to the denial of CAT relief failed because there was “substantial
evidence in the record” supporting the BIA’s and IJ’s decisions.94
In Thamotar v. U.S. Attorney General,95 Thamotar appealed the
BIA’s order affirming the IJ’s discretionary denial of his asylum
application, arguing that because his removal was withheld by the IJ, 8
C.F.R. § 1208.16(e)96 required reconsideration of his asylum claim.97
The Eleventh Circuit granted Thamotar’s petition, vacated the BIA’s

90. Id. at 866.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 866–67.
93. Id. at 868.
94. Id. at 869.
95. 1 F.4th 958 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
96. Id. at 971.
In the event that an applicant is denied asylum solely in the exercise of
discretion, and the applicant is subsequently granted withholding of
deportation or removal under this section, thereby effectively precluding
admission of the applicant’s spouse or minor children following to join him or
her, the denial of asylum shall be reconsidered. Factors to be considered will
include the reasons for the denial and reasonable alternatives available to the
applicant such as reunification with his or her spouse or minor children in a
third country.
Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(e) (removed and reserved by 85 F.R. 67202–01) (effective
Dec. 31, 2022)).
97. Thamotar, 1 F.4th at 962–63.
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order, and remanded the case to the BIA with instructions to remand to
the IJ for reconsideration of the discretionary denial of asylum.98
During his credible fear interview, Thamotar stated he was driving
customers in his taxi when he was stopped at a military checkpoint.99
After discovering he was Tamil and accusing him of being part of the
LTTE, the Sri Lankan army officials arrested him and took him to a
camp where they interrogated and tortured him. During his fourteenday imprisonment, Thamotar “was hung upside down, beaten, and
given urine to drink instead of water.”100 Just three days after his
release, army officials came to his home, beat him, attacked his wife
and son, and threatened to kill his daughter.101
After admitting the allegations in his notice to appear and conceding
removability, Thamotar applied for asylum, withholding of removal,
and CAT relief based on his race, political opinion, nationality, and
membership in a particular social group.102 Due to discrepancies in his
credible fear interview, application, and accompanying materials, the IJ
found Thamotar not credible and denied his application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT relief, and the BIA affirmed.103 The
Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to the BIA for further factfinding
on Thamotar’s fear of future persecution based on “his Tamil ethnicity
alone or in conjunction with his status as a failed asylum seeker,” and
the BIA remanded to the IJ.104
At his second removal hearing, Thamotar submitted additional
evidence, including news articles showing that “Tamils faced
persecution in Sri Lanka based on their ethnicity and status as failed
asylum seekers,” an updated affidavit from his father, and his marriage
certificate to clear up past discrepancies in his evidence and
testimony.105 He argued that the IJ should reconsider all the issues
because the BIA did not expressly retain jurisdiction or limit the IJ’s
inquiry on remand.106 The IJ, based on his previous findings and new
evidence submitted, granted him withholding of removal because he
was “more likely than not to face persecution” if he returned to Sri
Lanka because he was a Tamil-failed asylum seeker and there was a
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pattern or practice of persecution against Tamils.107 Because the Sri
Lankan government is responsible for the persecution, relocation within
Sri Lanka was not feasible.108 The IJ, however, denied Thamotar
asylum as a matter of discretion because he was granted withholding of
removal and thus would not face future persecution, he was not found
to be credible, and he did not seek asylum in other countries to which
he traveled before coming to the United States.109 The BIA affirmed and
concluded the IJ’s failure to reconsider its denial of asylum under 8
C.F.R. § 1208.16(e) did not warrant remand because family unification
alone was insufficient to overcome the negative factors outlined in the
IJ’s decision.110
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit questioned whether it had
jurisdiction to review an order denying asylum and held that granting
withholding of removal was a matter of first impression for the court.111
The INA limits the court’s jurisdiction to orders of removal, which are
defined as “a determination that a noncitizen is removable from the
United States or an order directing the noncitizen’s removal from the
United States.”112 Because an IJ must issue an order of removal before
granting a withholding of removal, the court held it had jurisdiction to
review.113 The court further held that the issue was not moot based on
the withholding of removal being granted because asylum status affords
more benefits than withholding of removal, such as allowing his wife
and children to join him in the United States as derivative asylees.114
The court next turned to whether the agency, as required by section
1208.16(e), properly reconsidered the IJ’s discretionary denial of asylum
despite granting a withholding of removal.115 Interpreting and applying
section 1208.16(e) for the first time, the court adopted other courts’
reasoning that “reconsideration of asylum is mandatory for a petitioner”
is “both logical and reasonable” when the petitioner has also been
granted a withholding of removal.116
107. Id. at 965–66.
108. Id. at 966.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 967.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 967–68.
114. Id. at 968–69.
115. The court noted that the Department of Justice and Department of Homeland
Security issued a final rule eliminating this regulation after Thamotar filed his appeal.
“Because the Rule does not provide for retroactive application, it applies only
prospectively and thus does not impact Mr. Thamotar’s appeal.” Id. at 971 n.10.
116. Id. at 971–72.

2022

IMMIGRATION

1295

Although the court found section 1208.16(e)’s mandate of
reconsideration to be clear, it noted that the scope of the
reconsideration was not.117 Specifically, the court questioned whether
the agency must reweigh the “totality of the circumstances” or
“address . . . only the factor of reasonably available alternatives for
family reunification.”118 Ultimately, the court held it is the IJ who must
“assess the impact of the asylum denial on [the petitioner’s] ability to be
reunited with his family,” determine whether there are reasonable
alternatives available for the petitioner’s family to reunify, and then
conduct the reconsideration by reevaluating the totality of the
circumstances and reweighing the positive and negative factors, “paying
particular attention to the reasonable alternatives for family
reunification.”119 Because the IJ failed to do this in Thamotar’s case, the
court vacated the BIA’s decision and remanded to the IJ for
reconsideration of the discretionary denial of asylum.120
In a case with a much less complicated procedural history, the
Eleventh Circuit in Luna-Flores v. U.S. Attorney General121 held that it
did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal.122 The BIA had not allowed
Luna-Flores to reinstate his appeal “given his perceived need to return
to Mexico rather than stay at an immigration detention facility while
his appeal was pending.”123 As such, the court reasoned, the BIA’s
discretionary decision was not a final order, and the court lacked
jurisdiction over the matter.124
In Cherubin v. U.S. Attorney General,125 Cherubin failed to exhaust
her administrative remedies.126 Cherubin, a Haitian citizen, and her
minor daughter applied for asylum and withholding of removal with the
assistance of counsel. Counsel withdrew before her removal hearing,
and she proceeded pro se. The IJ denied Cherubin’s claims, concluding
that her asylum application was untimely, her testimony was not
credible, and she failed to provide any corroborating evidence.127
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In her notice of appeal to the BIA, Cherubin described her reasons
for appeal as “having the time to file a written brief,” “to review all the
facts which sustain my case,” “to restate more carefully the subject of
my request for asylum,” and “to provide also as needed reliable
documentation to support my claim,” and indicated she would file a
written brief.128 Cherubin then failed to submit a brief, and the BIA
affirmed the IJ’s decision.129
On appeal, Cherubin argued that the BIA and IJ failed to properly
analyze her credibility and to give her an opportunity to provide
corroborating testimony.130 Because she did not raise these issues to the
BIA or file a written brief, the Eleventh Circuit held that she failed to
exhaust her administrative remedies, and therefore, the court lacked
jurisdiction to hear her case.131
In Ingry v. U.S. Attorney General,132 Colombian sisters also failed to
exhaust administrative remedies, leading the Eleventh Circuit to hold
that it lacked jurisdiction.133 The sisters, Angie and Ingry, were
threatened and harassed via social media by the man dating Angie’s exboyfriend and estranged father to her child, who was a police officer
named Jhon Ruiz. At one point, the officer came to Angie’s house with
two other officers and destroyed her personal property while looking for
Angie’s ex-boyfriend. After going to a police station where Ruiz did not
work, Angie’s ex-boyfriend was arrested, but Ruiz was not.134
The sisters went to the United States during the investigation and
applied for asylum, which the IJ denied because (1) they did not provide
corroborating evidence, (2) Ruiz’s threats did not amount to past
persecution, (3) they did not establish a nexus between the threats and
their proposed social group, and (4) they did not establish a wellfounded fear that the Colombian government would not protect them
from Ruiz.135 The BIA affirmed.136
Because the sisters failed to raise the argument of sufficiency of
corroborating evidence in their appeal to the BIA, the Eleventh Circuit
held that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the argument.137 It
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854 F. App’x 321 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
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further held that Ruiz’s actions did not amount to past persecution, and
substantial evidence supported (1) the IJ’s finding that there was no
nexus between the threats and the proposed social group, and (2) the
IJ’s finding that the sisters did not establish “that they were unable to
avail themselves of Colombia’s judicial system.”138
In Hernandez-Trochez v. U.S. Attorney General,139 the Eleventh
Circuit again held that Hernandez-Trochez failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies.140 At her hearing, she presented affidavits
with conflicting testimony regarding their origination. The BIA
remanded her initial appeal to the IJ “after concluding that it was
clearly erroneous to find Hernandez-Trochez[‘s] testimony not credible
merely because of the discrepancies concerning the affidavits.”141 After
her second hearing, the IJ again did not find Hernandez-Trochez
credible. She appealed to the BIA, arguing that the BIA had already
determined she was credible and that the case should be remanded “to
give her the opportunity to define her [particular social group]
according to decisions released after her case was submitted.”142 The
BIA dismissed her appeal.143
At the Eleventh Circuit, Hernandez-Trochez argued that in light of
the Attorney General’s recent decision in Matter of A-B-,144 the BIA
erred in not remanding the matter so she could restate her particular
social group claim.145 Because her reference to “decisions released after”
her case submitted to the IJ was vague and did not specifically
reference Matter of A-B-, the Eleventh Circuit held that the BIA was
not afforded an opportunity to consider the argument, which failed to
satisfy the exhaustion requirement and grant the court jurisdiction.146
Hernandez-Trochez also argued that the IJ deprived her of due process
because he was determined to reach the same credibility finding in the
second hearing as he did in the first.147 Because her brief to the BIA did
not raise a due process claim, the court held that Hernandez-Trochez
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Id. at 325.
853 F. App’x 331 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
Id. at 336.
Id. at 333.
Id. at 334.
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27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (B.I.A. June 11, 2018)
Hernandez-Trochez, 853 F. App’x at 336.
Id. at 334, 336.
Id. at 336.
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also failed to exhaust her remedies as to this claim, and thus, the court
lacked jurisdiction.148
The petitioner in Giron-Garcia v. U.S. Attorney General149 also failed
to exhaust her administrative remedies.150 Giron-Garcia challenged the
merits of the BIA’s and IJ’s denial of asylum based on her failure to
establish a well-founded fear of future persecution.151 The Eleventh
Circuit reasoned that because Giron-Garcia did not challenge the IJ’s
conclusion that she failed to demonstrate any nexus between her fear of
future persecution based on her being a member of a protected
particular social group, she failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies.152
In Vikulin v. U.S. Attorney General,153 the Eleventh Circuit held that
it lacked jurisdiction to consider Vikulin’s challenge of the BIA’s denial
of his application for adjustment of status.154 In December 2004, Vikulin
was ordered to depart to Kazakhstan for failure to maintain his student
status for his student visa, but he failed to depart. In 2010, Vikulin was
arrested for a DUI and successfully moved to reopen his removal
proceedings to seek asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief.
After multiple continuances, his hearing was held in 2017. The IJ found
him credible but denied his application, finding that he was targeted
because of his family’s wealth and ability to pay bribes, rather than
membership in a particular social group, and that he could reasonably
relocate upon his return.155
While his BIA appeal was pending, Vikulin moved to remand so that
the IJ could consider an application for adjustment of status based on
an approved immigrant visa petition that his mother had filed for
him.156 The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, dismissed the appeal, and
granted his motion. After his second hearing, the IJ denied Vikulin’s
application for adjustment of status because he “failed to demonstrate
good moral character” due to his DUIs, revocation of probation based on
a positive drug test, and possession of cocaine charge.157 Vikulin
appealed to the BIA, and, again, moved to remand for his application
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for adjustment of status, this time asserting that his cocaine charge had
been dismissed. The BIA denied his application for adjustment of
status, dismissed his appeal, and denied his motion for remand.158 The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the BIA’s decision regarding Vikulin’s
asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief claims.159 But it held
that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary decision
regarding adjustment of status because “this type of claim, although
couched in due process terms, does not state a colorable constitutional
claim and instead is a challenge to the BIA’s exercise of its
discretion.”160
In Camarena v. Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,161
the consolidated appeals of two immigrants who admitted they were
subject to valid removal orders were denied by the Eleventh Circuit for
lack of jurisdiction.162 Yet, when the government moved to execute the
orders, they sued. Both had applied for provisional unlawful presence
waivers, which, if granted, would make it easier to return to the United
States in the future. They argued that the government cannot remove
them yet because removal would interfere with their “regulatory rights”
to remain in the United States while they apply for the waivers.163 The
Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction because 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(g)164 “bars federal courts from hearing ‘any cause or claim’ by an
alien ‘arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to . . .
execute removal orders.’”165
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The only Eleventh Circuit opinion issued this past year regarding
standard of review involved a dissenting opinion by now-retired Judge
Martin.
In Lie Ye Xiao v. U.S. Attorney General,166 the Eleventh Circuit held
that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner’s
second motion to reopen his removal proceedings.167 After the IJ denied

158. Id. at 811.
159. Id. at 814.
160. Id. at 815.
161. 988 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2021).
162. Id. at 1270.
163. Id.
164. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (2005).
165. Camarena, 988 F.3d at 1272 (citing Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999)).
166. 846 F. App’x 745 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
167. Id. at 745.
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the petitioner’s applications, the BIA affirmed, and the petitioner did
not appeal.168 The following year, the petitioner filed his first motion to
reopen the removal proceedings, arguing that, based on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions,169 his notice to appear was
defective.170 The BIA denied the motion, and the petitioner did not
appeal. Two months later, the petitioner filed his second motion to
reopen based on changed conditions in his home country of China,
which the BIA denied. His appeal to the Eleventh Circuit followed.171
Reviewing the BIA’s fact findings under the “highly deferential
substantial evidence test,” the Eleventh Circuit held that the BIA did
not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner’s second motion, and
furthermore, the second motion was successive and time-barred.172
Judge Martin dissented, stating that although motions to reopen are
subject to time and number limits, those limits do not apply if the
motion is based on changed circumstances in his home country.173
Because the petitioner “submitted hundreds of pages of evidence about
how conditions in China have changed since his initial application for
asylum was denied,” she stated the BIA should have considered the
evidence.174
IV. OTHER COMMON ISSUES
Due to the multifaceted nature of immigration law, issues not fitting
quite as neatly into the aforementioned categories exist, such as
naturalization and habeas corpus. Illustrations of such cases are
summarized below.
A. Naturalization
In United States v. Osorto,175 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
defendant’s sentence, thereby rejecting Osorto’s procedural due process
and equal protection challenges to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual Sections 2L1.2(b)(2)176 and (3)177 because those subsections
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unlawfully discriminate against noncitizens.178 Because Osorto had
been convicted of a felony with a sentence of at least five years while in
the United States illegally, ordered to be deported, reentered illegally,
and then ordered to be deported upon his second illegal reentry, the
pre-sentence investigation report recommended a four-level increase
pursuant to section 2L1.2(b)(3)(D)179 at his sentencing hearing, which
the district court adopted.180 The court held that: (1) defendant’s
challenge to section 2L1.2(b)(2) was foreclosed by circuit precedent; (2)
Osorto’s argument “consider[ed] the wrong universe of individuals” for
an equal protection challenge because section 2L1.2(b)(2) and (3) “do not
apply to all noncitizens convicted of any crime[,]” but rather to
“noncitizens who both have illegally reentered the United States and
have been convicted of other crimes[;]” (3) through 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)181,
Congress “determined that illegally reentering the United States after
being deported following conviction on another crime is a more serious
offense than simply illegally reentering the United States, and that
conduct should be deterred[;]” (4) Congress vested the United States
Sentencing Commission with “responsibility for fostering and protecting
the interests of, among other things, sentencing policy that promotes
deterrence and appropriately punishes culpability and risk of
recidivism[;]” and (5) “subsections 2L1.2(b)(2) and (3) are rationally
related to the Commission’s stated interests in issuing them.”182
In United States v. Izquierdo,183 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a),184
Izquierdo pleaded guilty to unlawful procurement of naturalization and
citizenship.185 Specifically, he committed perjury when indicating on his
Immigration Form N-400 Application for Naturalization that he had
never committed a crime for which he was not arrested.186 A year later,
he pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit fraud for the past three years.
Then, after pleading guilty to violating section 1425(a), he appealed,
contending, among other things, that the application terms “crime” and
“offense” are so broad that the question was unconstitutionally vague
and required him to incriminate himself.187 The Eleventh Circuit
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disagreed, holding that the void-for-vagueness doctrine188 did not apply
to an immigration naturalization form—only criminal offenses.189
In Hylton v. U.S. Attorney General,190 the Eleventh Circuit held that
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii),191 which provides for the removal of an
alien convicted of an aggravated felony after admission, did not apply to
an alien who was an American citizen at the time he was convicted of
the felony.192 It further held that denaturalization of the alien who
obtained his citizenship by fraud did not have retroactive effect to
render the alien removable based on his conviction.193 The day of
Hylton’s naturalization ceremony, he falsely affirmed that since his
naturalization interview, he had not knowingly committed a crime or
offense not resulting in an arrest.194 “Six days before the ceremony,
Hylton had robbed a bank,” for which he pleaded guilty the next year.195
Because he was an American citizen by the time he pleaded guilty, he
could not be removed according to the plain language of section
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).196 Furthermore, because Hylton was not an alien at
the time of his conviction, the court held that he thus could not be
denaturalized.197
B. Habeas Corpus
In Sebastian-Soler v. Noble ex rel. Clerk of the Court,198 the Eleventh
Circuit held that under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1734199 and 1735,200 a noncitizen
was not entitled to relief.201 In 1969, Sebastian-Soler emigrated to the
United States and obtained permanent resident status before applying
for naturalization, which was denied for lack of prosecution. Four years
later, he was convicted of seven felony counts. After being released from
188. The due process void-for-vagueness doctrine “bars enforcement of a [criminal]
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
[individuals] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application.” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997).
189. Izquierdo, 853 F. App’x at 365.
190. 992 F.3d 1154 (11th Cir. 2021).
191. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2008).
192. Hylton, 992 F.3d at 1161.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1156.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1161.
197. Id.
198. 845 F. App’x 812 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
199. 28 U.S.C. § 1734 (1948).
200. 28 U.S.C. § 1735 (2021).
201. Sebastian-Soler, 845 F. App’x at 815.
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prison, removal proceedings were initiated. The IJ issued a removal
order to his home country of Cuba, and the BIA affirmed. The Eleventh
Circuit dismissed his initial appeal in 2005, and then moved the BIA to
reopen his removal proceedings twelve years later, which it denied.
Sebastian-Soler then filed his second motion to reopen, arguing that he
had new evidence—specifically, Administrative Order (AO) 84-11—
indicating he had become a naturalized citizen, which the BIA
denied.202 The Eleventh Circuit subsequently dismissed his appeal.203
“The appellees now have moved for summary affirmance of the
district court’s dismissal of Sebastian-Soler’s complaint seeking
certified copies of AO 84-11, arguing that 28 U.S.C. §§ 1734 and 1735 do
not permit Sebastian-Soler to obtain the relief that he seeks.”204 Section
1734 allows for certain substitutes of certified records.205 Section 1735,
however, states: “Whenever the United States is interested in any lost
or destroyed records or files of a court . . ., the clerk . . . and the United
States attorney for the district shall take the steps necessary to restore
such records or files . . .”206 In other words, section 1735 applies only
when the United States is a party to a pending or contemplated legal
proceeding where a certified copy of the record is requested and
available or when the United States is the party seeking to establish
the record.207 Neither of those circumstances applied here, and the
Eleventh Circuit granted the motion for summary affirmance.208
V. CONCLUSION
The cases discussed herein are those that annunciate important
issues, add flourishes to the existing standards and rules, offer
important reminders of precedent and practice points, or otherwise
illuminate the boundaries of the Eleventh Circuit’s immigration
jurisprudence. During this Survey period, the Biden Administration
began implementing new policies for individuals entering the United
States that took a different direction from the previous
administration.209 The next Survey period will likely determine how the
Eleventh Circuit will interpret those.
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